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INTRODUCTION

When in 1758 Lord Mansfield declared that an innocent innkeeper
could collect a stolen bank note he had taken in payment, the doctrine
of holder in due course was launched.' Miller v. Race incorporated a
large chunk of the law merchant into the common law by recognizing
that a "bank note is constantly and universally both at home and abroad
treated as money, as cash; and paid and received in cash; and it is necessary, for the purposes of commerce, that their currency should be estab2
lished and secured."
Lord Mansfield would probably be surprised at the uses of his
holder in due course doctrine in the modern setting.' As codified in
the U.C.C., 4 the doctrine authorizes the good faith lender who purchases
a negotiable instrument to collect the instrument from the debtor in all
except the most compelling circumstances. For instance consider a retail

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University; B.A. 1967, University of Texas-Arlington; J.D. 1971, University of Texas-Austin.
** Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University; B.S. 1968, J.D.
1971, Willamette University; L.L.M. 1972, Harvard University.
I. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
2. Id. at 402.
3. The literature treating the modern holder in due course doctrine is voluminous. For a few significant contributions dealing with the doctrine as it pertains to consumer transactions, see Benson & Squillante, The Role of the Holder in
Due Course in Consumer Credit Transaction, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1974); Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachronisms in Consumer Credit, 52
TEx. L. REv. 1 (1973); Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The
Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966); Littlefield, Preservation
of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans and Credit Card Transactions-RecentStatutes, Policies, and a Proposal, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 471; Murphy, Another "Assault
Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses
in Consumer Sales, 79 OHio ST. L. J. 667 (1968); Rohner, Holder in Due Course in
Consumer Transactions:Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503
(1975); Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1971).

4. U.C.C. § 3-302 provides in part:
(1) A holder in due couse is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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furniture store that sells the consumer a sofa on credit by taking a
negotiable note from the consumer payable to the furniture store. The
store then sells the note signed by the consumer to a finance company.
The finance company can demand payment even though the furniture
store breached its contract with the consumer by failing to deliver the
sofa or by delivering one that is worthless. 5 Only in the most extreme
and statistically irrelevant cases will the consumer have a defense against
the all-powerful lender.6 The "real defenses" available in such cases include infancy, duress, illegality, and minority.7 In the vast majority of
cases, the law permits the lender to enforce the breached contract, even
8
though the seller would not be able to do so.
When the consumer started to vigorously participate in the postWorld War II credit economy, 9 the doctrine of holder in due course,
which was originally intended to aid commerce by treating bank notes as
cash, 10 became a burden on commerce, at least from the consumer's
5. U.C.C. § 3-305. See generally Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule
and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,510-11 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Statement of Basis and Purpose]. For cases illustrating the
consumer's plight in such situations, see Calbert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244
A.2d 494 (D.C. 1968); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94
N.E.2d 710 (1950).
6. Bowen (panelist), Holder in Due Course: Does the Consumer Pay?, 32 Bus.
LAW. 591, 595 (1977).
7. U.C.C. § 3-305 provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract;
and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction,
as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he
takes the instrument.
8. See note 5 supra. See also Bowen, supra note 6, at 595.
9. From 1950 to 1971 aggregate consumer installment debt increased
fivefold to $137.2 billion. From 1971 (when rule 433 was first proposed) to 1974
the aggregate debt climbed to $154.5 billion. As of August, 1974, finance companies, retailers, and other institutions subject to FTC jurisdiction held in excess
of $75 billion in consumer installment debt. Statement of Basis and Purpose,
supra note 5, at 53,507.
10. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), involved title to a stolen
instrument; it did not involve a debtor seeking to assert a personal defense
against a remote assignee. See also Comment, Preservation of Consumer Claims and
Defenses: Miller's Tale Tolled by FTC (Or Is It?), 47 Miss. L.J. 768 (1976). See generally J. GALBRAITH, MONEY (1974).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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viewpoint." The holder in due course doctrine places the cost of seller
misconduct on the buyer instead of the lender. 12 Given the apparent
inabilities of consumers to pursue their rights against sellers through
cosly litigation," the guilty seller often was able to keep the proceeds of
his misconduct. Meanwhile, the lender could legally enforce the sales
contract breached by the seller and could legally demand that the buyer
pay for goods which he may never have received or which no longer
work.
In response to the changing reality occasioned by massive consumer
credit, a majority of states, by both statute and judicial decision, have
limited the operation of the holder in due course doctrine with respect
to consumers. 1 4 By statute some states have eliminated holder in due
course altogether,"' while many court decisions have refused to grant
preferential status to what would otherwise be a holder in due course if
the lender and the seller are "closely-connected." 16
As a result of this legislative and judicial curtailment of the doctrine
of holder in due course, lenders and sellers have resorted to other
techniques to avoid defenses on commercial paper generated in consumer transactions. Contractually, by incorporating a "waiver of defense"
clause into a non-negotiable instrument, the seller requires the buyer to
11. That the holder in due course doctrine as applied to consumers is a burden on commerce is both the source of jurisdiction for the FTC and the raison
d'etre for rule 433. See generally Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at
53,526.
12. Id. at 53,524. For an extensive treatment of cost allocation theory, see G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS

(1970).

13. At the heart of rule 433 is the notion that, without assistance, consumers
are incapable of "internalizing" the costs of seller misconduct, i.e., a commercial
system which enables sellers and creditors to divorce the consumer's obligation to
pay from the seller's obligation to perform allocates all the costsof seller misconduct to the consumer. Of all the parties to a consumer sales transaction, the
consumer is the least able to negotiate a price which reflects all the costs of the
transaction, including the costs of seller misconduct. The stated purpose of rule

433 is to reduce the costs of misconduct to a minimum and to incorporate remaining costs into the price of consumer goods. Thus, goods are to be priced
more nearly to reflect actual social costs. It is the FTC's position that this results
in optimum allocation of society's resources. Statement of Basis and Purpose,
supra note 5, at 53,522-23.
14. Id. at 53,508. See 2 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER LAW
HANDBOOK 574-92 (1972); Comment, The Federal Trade Commission Rule on the
Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses-What Price Protection?, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 815, 821 (1976).

15. For examples of state legislation which eliminate the effective use of the
holder in due course doctrine in all consumer goods or service transactions, see
ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 319(a) (1973); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-2-404 (1976); Wyo. STAT. §
40-2-403 (Supp. 1975).
16. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). See also Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969). See generally Annot., 39
A.L.R.3d 518 (1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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sign away his right to assert personal defenses resulting from the seller's
breach of contract against the lender who is attempting to enforce that
same contract. 17 Another technique is the direct loan, where the seller
directs the buyer to a specific bank or loan company to borrow the
money for the purchase.1 8 The direct loan gives the appearance that the
loan and the sale are separate transactions. The direct lender, therefore,
is not forced into the position of having to prove himself a holder in due
course or the beneficiary of a waiver of defense clause because he will
not be attempting to collect on a contract that has been breached by the
seller. The direct lender will be enforcing a contract between himself
and the consumer- a contract the direct lender fully performed when
he gave the money to the buyer.' 9 The direct lender can claim with a
straight face that it is no concern of his that the buyer lost the money,
gambled it away, spent it on a bad vacation, or purchased a lousy sofa.
In response to the patchwork of state regulation2 0 and the clever
devices used by lenders and sellers to avoid such regulation, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) stepped into the fray. On May 14, 1976, FTC
rule 433 became effective. 21 The rule's stated purpose is to deny preferred lender status to financers of consumer goods and services. 22 It

attempts to do so by declaring it to be an unfair and deceptive trade
practice for the seller to fail to incorporate a legend in his sales contract
that will preserve the consumer's claims and defenses against the

17. U.C.C. § 9-206 provides in part:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or
lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense
which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an
assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may
be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
under the Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as
part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
18. See section II (A) infra. For state legislative responses to the direct loan
ploy, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12F (West Supp. 1977); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 253-254 (McKinney Supp. 1977). For a report of how a truly
insidious "direct loan" works, see the account of John Hatch in Statement of
Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at 53,514.
19. "[T]he-[borrowers] came to the office of the [lender] seeking a loan.
They executed the note in question and all the money called for by its terms was
delivered. The [borrowers] got full value for the note they signed." Commercial
Credit Plan, Inc. v. Beebe, 187 A.2d 502 (Vt. 1963). See also note 105 infra.
20. For an excellent summary of state judicial and legislative responses, see 2
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER LAW HANDBOOK 503-92 (1972).

21. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1977).
22. Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022, 20,023 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Guidelines].
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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lender.23 The lender was not directly regulated because at the time the
rule was proposed the FTC had no jurisdiction over banks (which are
regulated by the Federal Reserve Board).14 Thus, to avoid regulating a
part of the lender community, the rule was written to exempt lenders
completely.
In an assignment situation, where the buyer gives the seller a note
and the seller in turn discounts the note to a remote lender, the rule
requires that the seller include in the loan papers (in ten-point type) the
following legend or be subject to FTC sanctions:
NOTICE. ANY HOLDER OF THIS COMSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OB-

23. Id. The FTC's authority to declare unlawful and prohibit unfair practices
is found at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). It is doubtful that the commission could have
proposed this rule under the original Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,
ch. 311, 38 Stat. 711. A circuit court decision interpreting the original act held
that FTC authority did not extend to purely consumer affairs which did not
affect competition. Raladam Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930). The
Raladam decision is criticized in Handler, The Jurisdictionof the Federal Trade Commission Over False Advertising; 31 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1931).

In any case, the FTC act was amended in 1938 so that the commission could
regulate consumer-oriented issues. Rather than speaking in terms of "unfair
methods of competition," ch. 311; § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), the 1938 Wheeler-Lea
Amendment encompassed "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
The purpose of this change was to extend protection to consumers where there
was no anticompetitive effect from the deceptive act. 83 CONG. REC. 395 (1938);
H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1938).
More recently, FTC authority has been attacked on a number of grounds. It
has been held, for instance, that the FTC lacks authority to issue substantive
rules and regulations. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp.
1343 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Commentators have
suggested that FTC authority does not extend to purely intrastate transactions.
Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions:Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 503, 525-26 (1975). See also Note, Preserving Consumer Claims and Defenses: The Code of Federal Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433, 6 CAP.

L. REv. 461, 462-63 (1977).
These attacks have been answered by recent amendments which explicitly
grant rule-making authority to the FTC and should be interpreted to give FTC
regulations the fullest possible commerce power scope. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1),
57(a) (Supp. V 1975); [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7712-13,
7714-15.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970). At the same time that rule 433 became effective the FTC proposed an amendment which would make it applicable to creditors as well. 40 Fed. Reg. 53,530 (1975). This action was made possible by passage of the FTC Improvement Act of 1975 which requires the issuance of a
duplicate rule covering banks by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 57(0(1) (West Supp. 1976). At the present time a companion FRB regulation
to rule 433, which would be binding on banks, is in the proposal stage. 41 Fed.
Reg. 7110-11 (1976).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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TAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS
HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR
SHALL NOT EXCEED
AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
25
HEREUNDER.
If the consumer borrows money directly from the lender and thus
the seller never touches the note, the seller violates the FTC rule if he
accepts the proceeds of a direct loan which fails to include' a similar
26
legend preserving the consumer's claims and defenses.
The problem with the rule is manifest in that it puts the onus of
preserving the buyer's claims or defenses on the seller rather than on
the lender. The lender is not directly regulated, and his status is not
directly affected.
This half step by the FTC provokes exceptionally complicated legal
issues. The rights and liabilities of the consumer and the lender involve
detailed legal argument and analysis requiring consideration of numerous factors: whether the lender is attempting to collect or the buyer is
attempting to recover the payments already made; whether the loan
papers include or fail to include the FTC legend preserving the claims
and defenses; and whether the creditor is lending directly to the consumer or indirectly by taking an assignment of the note from the seller.
In some cases, the result may even hinge on the nature of the assigned
paper, i.e., whether the note is negotiable or non-negotiable.
This article will offer an analysis of the status of the consumer and
the lender under the U.C.C. now that the FTC rule is in operation.
27
Although many commentators have written about the new FTC action,
most have either simply assumed that the rule has successfully elimi-

25. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
26. [I]t is an unfair or deceptive act or practice ... for a seller ... to:
(b) Accept, as full or partial payment for such sale or lease, the
proceeds of any purchase money loan (as purchase money loan is
defined herein), unless any consumer credit contract made in connection with such purchase money loan contains the following provision in at least ten point, bold face type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS
OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF.
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Hansford, The Holder in Due Course-An Endangered Species?, 37
ALA. LAWYER 540 (1976); Rohner, Holder in Due Course In Consumer Transactions:
Requiem, Revival or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 503 (1975); Comment, The
FTC Proposed Rule and the Holder In Due Course; 18 S.D.L. Rev. 516 (1973).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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nated preferential lender status, 28 or have engaged in rather bizarre
reasoning to arrive at that conclusion. 9 Section I of this paper will deal
with the scope of the FTC rule and will point out situations where the
seller is in violation of the rule. Section II will deal with the effect rule
433 will have on the ender's status under the U.C.C. The writers' analysis
indicates that in an overwhelming majority of cases the FTC rule, in
conjunction with the U.C.C., ought to prove successful in preserving
both the defenses and claims of the buyer. The FTC rule achieves this
result even in cases where the legend is not incorporated into the contract. The organizational approach will be as follows:
I. THE SELLER'S LIABILITY TO FTC SANCTION: SCOPE OF THE
NEW RULE

A. Parties
B. Transactions
1. Assignment of the Consumer's Note to a Holder in
Due Course
2. Assignment of Paper Containing a Waiver of Defense Clause
3. Direct Loans to the Consumer by a Third-Party
Lender
a. Referrals
b. Affiliation
4. Excluded Transactions
II. THE RULE'S EFFECT ON THE LENDER'S STATUS
A. Lender Sues Consumer For Payment
1. Legend Paper
2. Paper Not Containing the Required Legend
a. Holder in Due Course
b. Waiver of Defense Clause
c. The Direct Loan
B. Consumer Claims Against the Lender
1. Legend Paper
2. Paper Not Containing the Required Legend
a. Holder in Due Course
b. Waiver of Defense Clause
c. The Direct Loan
III. CONCLUSION

28. See, e.g., Comment, The New FTC Trade Regulations Rule on Holder In Due

Course, 13 Hous. L. REv. 789 (1976); Comment, Preservation of Claims and De-

fenses: Miller's Tale Tolled By FTC (Or Is it?), 47 Miss. L.J. 768, 783-84 (1976);
Comment, Consumer Protection: Proposed Federal Trade Commission Rule-Preservation of Buyers' Claims and Defenses in Consumer Installment Sales, 21 J. PUB. L. 169,
183-84 (1972).
29. See Comment, Implied Consumer Remedy Under FTC Trade Regulation
Rule-Coup De Grace Dealt Holder In Due Course?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 876, 886-95
(1977) (suggesting that a cause of action be implied against a lender who has not
broken the law).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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THE SELLER'S LIABILITY TO FTC SANCTION:
SCOPE OF THE

NEW RuLE

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty- Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act granted the FTC new powers to enforce its rules. 30
Until recently, the FTC was limited to the use of a cease and desist
order in preventing unfair and deceptive trade practices. The FTC now
can require (by means of rescission, reformation, damages, etc.) the violator to civilly "redress injury" suffered by the party the FTC rule was
intended to protect.3 1 This section will describe the operation of rule
433 and thereby set forth those situations in which the seller will be
subject to these fortified FTC sanctions when he fails to insert the required legend.
A. Parties
As indicated in the introduction, the FTC was concerned primarily
with techniques used to cut off the consumer's claims and defenses
against the lender. Little concern was expressed for businessmen and
corporations who were perceived to be more capable of fending for
themselves. 32 Thus, rule 433 protects only a "natural person who seeks
33
to acquire goods and services for personal, family, or household use."
In addition, the rule applies only to a seller who "in the ordinary
34
course of business sells or leases goods or services to consumers."
Likewise, the sale must be financed by a commercial "creditor," "[a] person who, in the ordinary course of business, lends purchase money or
finances the sale of goods or services on a deferred payment basis." 35
The rule has no application if the lender is a rich uncle, if the buyer is
General Motors, or if the seller is your next door neighbor.
B. Transactions
1. Assignment of the Consumer's Note to a Holder in Due Course
As codified in Article Three of the U.C.C., the consumer is deprived of his defenses to collection by the assignment of a negotiable instrument to a holder in due course.3 6 Under the new rule, when the
seller of goods or services assigns a negotiable instrument 37 generated by
30. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975).
32. See generally Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at 53,507-08.
33. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(b) (1977).
34. Id. § 433.10().
35. Id. § 433.1(c).
36. See note 4 supra.
37. Under U.C.C. § 3-104(1) in order to be negotiable the paper must:
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer, and
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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the sale, to a commercial lender the seller commits an unfair and deceptive trade practice if he fails to incorporate the required legend. 38
Once again, it should be emphasized that the lender himself will not be
in violation of the rule. Section II infra will explore whether holder in
due course status will be denied the lender attempting to collect the
note.
2. Assignment of Paper Containing a Waiver of Defense Clause
A lender who is assigned non-negotiable paper containing a waiver
of defense clause is attempting to acquire the same rights as held by the
assignee of a negotiable note under the holder in due course doctrine.3 9 Like the holder in due course situation, a waiver of defense
clause enables the lender to collect without regard to the buyer's defenses against the seller. 40 Under the new FTC rule, the seller would be
committing an unfair and deceptive trade practice if he fails to include
in the loan papers the FTC legend preserving the consumer's claims and
41
defenses against the lender.
3. Direct Loans to the Consumer by a Third-Party Lender
The FTC discovered that the seller and the lender could finesse
both state legislation and judicial decisions which limited the doctrine of
holder in due course and the use of waiver of defense clauses. 42 The
finesse was achieved by employment of a direct loan whereby the seller
would direct the consumer to the lender. These loans (dubbed "dragging
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money and no other promise, order, obligation or power as given
by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and
(c)be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d)be payable to order or to bearer.
Thus, if the consumer signs a negotiable note in exchange for the sale of
services, goods, or even land, Article Three of the U.C.C. will govern his rights
and liabilities. Therefore, unlike Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code
which applies only to the sale of goods (U.C.C. § 2-102), a negotiable note given
as consideration for the sale of services will be governed by Article Three.
38. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
39. See note 17 supra.
40. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) expressly provides that under a waiver of defense
clause the assignee takes free from all claims and defenses except "defenses of a
type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument" under Article Three.
41. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
42. The original version of the rule did not cover direct loans from the
lender to the buyer. During the first set of hearings, however, the FTC elicited
testimony from consumer witnesses who related their unfortunate experiences in
this area. As a result of these case histories and the testimony of industry witnesses and public interest organizations, the FTC determined that "vendor-related loans should be covered by any Commission rule in this area." See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at 53,514-15.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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the body" 43 because they were tantamount to the seller's "dragging" the
consumer to the lender's office) gave the appearance that the sale and
the loan were separate transactions. There are even documented instances of door-to-door selling where the lender's agents made house
44
calls with the salesmen.
In response to these tactics, the new FTC rule provides that where
there is a connection between the lender and a seller, the seller engages
in a deceptive and unfair trade practice if he takes the proceeds of a
direct loan which does not contain the required legend. 45 Conversely, if
a consumer obtains a direct loan from the lender and there is no connection between the lender and the seller, the rule does not apply. 40
The obvious issue is whether there is a sufficient connection. The rule
sets forth two types of relationships, "referral" and "affiliation," that
trigger operation of rule 433.
a. Referral
If the seller "refers consumers to the creditor," 47 the seller violates
federal law if he takes the proceeds of a loan which fails to preserve the
consumer's claims and defenses. Thus, the literal language of the rule
would place any referral within the rule's scope. However, it appears
that occasional referrals are not governed by the rule. 48 Only the systematic and calculated channeling of consumers to a particular credit
outlet is regulated; the passing on of information to consumers about
potential sources of financing is not regulated. 49 Therefore, there is no
violation when a seller provides lists of financing institutions or even occasionally recommends one financing institution over another so long as
this is not done on a regular basis. 50 However, accdrding to the FTC
43. Id. at 53,514.
44. See Crandall, The Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws
Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 366 n.107.
45. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
46. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,025.
47. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d)(1) (1977).
48. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,025-26.
49. Id. at 20,025. In the words of the commission:
The word "refers" is intended to reach those situations where a
seller, in the ordinary course of business, is sending his buyers to a
particular loan outlet, or to particular outlets, for credit which is to be
used in the seller's establishment. In such circumstances, the seller is
effectively arranging credit for his customers.
No specific number of referrals is specified in the Rule. The key distinction is between those instances where a seller is merely passing along information about places where his buyers may obtain credit and those where a seller is
acting as a conduit for financing and channeling buyer-borrowers to a particular lender or limited group of lenders. (Emphasis added).
50. The FTC illustrates several situations where the Notice would be required in direct loan transactions in Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses-Statement of Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,594, 34,596 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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staff, once a referral relationship exists, all subsequent transactions involving the same seller and lender fall within the scope of the rule even
51
though some of the loans are not the result of a referral.
b. Affiliation
In addition to referrals, the rule requires that the loan papers contain the FTC legend if an "affiliation" relationship exists between the
seller and the lender. Affiliation exists when there is "common control,
contract, or business arrangement" 52 between the seller and lender. The
FTC staff guidelines indicate that while the "contract" or "business ar53
rangement" may be informal, an agreement nevertheless must exist.
The Commission considers the following examples of affiliated relationships:
Maintenance of loan application forms in the office of the
seller;
Joint participation in the processing of loan documents;
Creditors' referrals of customers to sales outlets;
Payment of consideration to a seller for furnishing loan customers or to a creditor for furnishing sales prospects;
Floor-planning or inventory financing arrangements which include or contemplate the assignment of indirect paper or the
referral of loan customers;
Active creditor participation in a sales program;
Joint advertising efforts;
54
An agreement to purchase paper on an indirect basis.
Thus, the rule requires either a formal or an informal agreement with
55
some lender participation in the selling of the goods or services.
4. Excluded Transactions
As indicated, the FTC rule protects only consumers and does not
extend to nonconsumer transactions. However, not every transaction involving a consumer falls within the scope of the rule. The rule applies
only to "consumer credit contract[s] "56 and defines this term by reference to the Federal Truth in Lending Act 5 7 and Regulation Z. 5s This
51. Id. See also Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,026.
52. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d)(2) (1977).
53. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,026.
54. Id.
55. Under the original rule, the establishment of facts given in the examples
gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that an affiliated relationship existed. 38
Fed. Reg. 892, 893 (1973). The use of rebuttable presumptions was eliminated in
the final rule because the FTC felt their application would be both unnecessary
and unwise. See Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at 53,525.
56. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970).
58. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977). See generally 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d), .1(e), .1(i)
(1977); Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at 53,524-25.
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definition excludes consumer purchases of goods if the amount to be
financed exceeds $25,000.00.
Credit card transactions also are exempted.6 0 During the hearings
prior to the adoption of the rule, there was substantial debate as to
whether it should apply to credit cards. 61 The FTC eventually decided
to exempt credit card transactions. Nevertheless, federal legislation was
passed which severely limits the ability of the credit card company to
insist upon payment of the credit card bill if the goods or services sold
were not as warranted. The Fair Credit Billing Act prevents the credit
card issuer from invoking a waiver of defense clause if the amount of
the purchase is in excess of $50.00 and if the purchase occurred in the
consumer's home state or within 100 miles of his residence. 62 Thus, for
most large, non-vacation purchases, the consumer will have the right not
to pay his credit card bill if the goods or services prove to be unsatisfactory.
II.

THE

RULE'S

EFFECT ON THE LENDER'S STATUS

The foregoing section outlined the circumstances under which the
seller commits an unfair and deceptive trade practice. The following
sections will analyze the rule's effect on the rights and liabilities of the
lender in two contexts: where the lender sues the consumer for payment, and where the consumer sues the lender to recover payments already made.
A. Lender Sues Consumer For Payment
1. Legend Paper
If the credit contract contains the legend required by rule 433,
of course the seller avoids committing a deceptive or unfair trade practice. The question discussed in this section is the effect of inclusion of
the legend on the lender's ability to collect. The FTC guidelines state
that the legend itself becomes a part of the contract. 63 When the legend

59. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3) (1970). The Truth in Lending definition also
exempts public utility service and consumer leases if the lease does not amount
to disguised sale. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(4) (1970).
60. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c) (1977).

61. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supa note 5, at 53,516. The FTC found
very little consumer abuse in this area in proportion to the volume of transactions, which in 1971 was estimated at over 300 million per year. Ross, The Credit
Card's Painful Coming-of-Age, FORTUNE, October, 1971, at 108. The Commission
also found that, in order to insure their subscribers continued satisfaction and
business, in some cases credit card issuers will intervene on the behalf of consumers in their disputes with sellers.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(i) (Supp. V 1975).
63. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,023.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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is incorporated into the contract, then at a minimum the lender has
waived any right to separate the buyer's obligation to repay from the
seller's obligation to perform. 64 In effect, by successfully threatening
the seller with FTC punishment, the seller is compelled to require the
lender to "agree" not to assert what would otherwise be his holder in
due course status or his rights under an inconsistent waiver of defense
clause, 65 or his rights to repayment of a direct loan. (Even a shot gun
wedding is better than no wedding at all.)
When the lender sues to collect and the FTC legend preserving the
consumer's "claims and defenses" is in the loan papers, the question becomes what sort of defenses can be raised against the lender that will
excuse the consumer's obligation for the unpaid balance of the loan. The
FTC staff guidelines state that the incorporated legend protects the consumer's right "to assert against the creditor any legally sufficient claim or
defense against the seller. The creditor stands in the shoes of the
seller." 66 The preservation of claims and defenses affected by rule 433
does not confer any new substantive rights on consumers. Rather, the
claims and defenses existing under the U.C.C. 67 are preserved, but not

enlarged.
The extent of the lender's responsibility for the seller's conduct is
illustrated by an example. Consumer buys a new $7,000 Buick on credit
and Seller discounts the paper incorporating the FTC legend to Finance
Company. Subsequently, Consumer buys a new Chevrolet for $4,000
cash from Seller. The Chevrolet turns out to be a lemon and Consumer
resists paying Finance Company for the Buick. The FTC staff addressed
this problem in a common sense manner by announcing a "same transaction" test. "The holder's obligations are limited to those arising from
the transaction which he finances." 6 8 Thus, the lender's right to payment is not burdened by problems between the seller and consumer that
are unrelated to the financed transaction.

64. Id.
65. The FTC staff takes the position that the text of the Notice cannot be
qualified by other language which limits the legend's effect. Therefore, a contract which contains both the FTC legend and a waiver of defense clause would
be an unfair and deceptive trade practice. Id.
66. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,023.
67. If the seller fails to deliver the goods, the buyer has a remedy under
U.C.C. §§ 2-713 and 2-715. If the seller delivers the goods, their quality must
meet certain standards. The quality terms for goods imposed by the U.C.C. are
as follows: express warranties under U.C.C. § 2-313; implied warranties of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314; implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose under U.C.C. § 2-315. The seller's failure to conform to these quality
terms gives rise to buyer's remedies under U.C.C. §§ 2-714 and 2-715. Buyers'
remedies, including cover and recovery of identified goods, are treated generally
at U.C.C. § 2-711.
68. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,024.
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2. Paper Not Containing the Required Legend
The problems are more complex when the lender attempts to collect
and the loan papers do not contain the legend. As indicated above, the
seller may be exposed to FTC sanctions. However, the effect of the
seller's violation on the lender's ability to collect is a question that many
commentators simply have assumed to be answered in the consumer's
favor.69 The problem must be analyzed in three contexts-holder in
due course, waiver of defense clause, and direct loan-each of which in
the past would have placed the lender in a preferred collecting status.
a. Holder in Due Course
When the seller assigns the consumer's negotiable note to the
lender, the lender becomes a holder in due course if he has complied
with the requirements of U.C.C. section 3-302.70 That section requires
that the lender take the paper in good faith, for value, and without
notice of a defense to the note's collectibility. Obviously, because the
commercial lender almost always will buy the note, the consumer's arguments under section 3-302 will be based upon notice and lack of good
faith.
Certainly the lender's knowledge that the loan papers do not contain
the FTC legend cannot be considered "notice of a defense" under section 3-302 because that section traditionally has been interpreted to require notice of an existing defense. 71 If the FTC legend is missing, the
lender would not be on notice of an existing defense; he only would be
on notice that the consumer's defenses have not been preserved.7 2 Sec69. See note 28 supra.
70. See note 4 supra.
71. U.C.C. § 3-304(6) provides that notice is effective only if received so that
the recipient can act on it. Thus, a defense arising after the holder takes the
negotiable note gives him no opportunity to act on it. See Crest Fin. Co., Inc. v.
First State Bank, 37 Ill. 2d 243, 226 N.E.2d 369 (1967); Branch Banking & Trust
Co. v. Gill, 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 44, 112 N.W.2d 381 (1961). See generally 10 C.J.S.
Bills and Notes § 332 (1972).
72. If a court did not feel bound to a literal interpretation of the U.C.C. and
was willing to decide these cases on policy grounds supporting the notice requirement, the lender's knowledge that the seller should have put the FTC
legend in the loan papers should be sufficient notice to deprive the lender of
holder in due course status. As U.C.C. § 3-302 now reads, the lender's knowledge that the seller has breached his contractual duties to the consumer permits
the consumer to assert his defenses to payment against the lender. Now that the
FTC requires the seller to preserve the consumer's defenses, the lender's knowledge that the seller has breached his duty to preserve those defenses should
allow the consumer to assert those defenses against the lender. If the lender's
knowledge of an existing defense burdens his rights on the negotiable note with
respect to that defense, his knowledge that defenses should have been preserved
also should burden his rights on the note. In this regard, it is the lender's knowlhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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don 3-304 elaborates on what is meant by taking the instrument "without
notice of claim or defense" and declares that the lender does take with
notice of a claim or defense if the note is "so incomplete ...so irregular
as to call into question its validity (or) terms... .-73 While the cases have
dealt only with missing signatures and the like,7 4 an Indiana court declared in dictum that if a federal regulation required certain terms to be
incorporated into a note and those terms were excluded, the note would
be irregular on its face. 75 It certainly seems persuasive that when federal law requires all consumer paper to contain a clause which preserves
the consumer's claims and defenses the note would be incomplete and
irregular without it.
Moreover, the lender may not qualify as a holder in due course on
the ground that he did not take the paper in good faith. Good faith is
defined by section 1-201 (19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 7 6 This section generally has been interpreted to
provide for a "subjective" test of honesty.7 7 In the modern setting
edge that he is purchasing a consumer credit contract that should put him on
notice because he is presumed to know that the law requires that the legend be
placed in such contracts.
73. U.C.C. § 3-304(1)(a).
74. See, e.g., Winter & Hirsch, Inc. v. Passarelli, 122 Ill. App. 2d 372, 259
N.E.2d 312 (1970); Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div. 2d 597, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1968); McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973).
75. Western State Bank v. First Union Bank & Trust Co., 360 N.E.2d 254
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977). The issuer of certificates of deposits (negotiable instruments) contended that Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve Board required that
the certificates indicate a maturity date and interest rate, and that because the
certificates in question did not contain a maturity date or an interest rate, they
were irregular on their face such that there could be no holder in due course
status for the holder of the certificates. The court held that Regulation Q did not
require an indication of an interest rate or maturity date and therefore did not
decide whether the omission made the certificates irregular. Nevertheless, the
court did state in dictum that § 3-304(1)(a) contemplated more than intrinsic
irregularities, thereby implying that the certificates would have been irregular if
Regulation Q had not been complied with.
76. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
77. See Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81
(1st Cir. 1970); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Boardwalk Nat'l Bank, 101
N.J. Super. 528, 245 A.2d 35 (1968). However, there are occasional cases which
deviate from an emphasis on actual knowledge. See Oklahoma Nat'l Bank v.
Equitable Credit Fin. Co., 489 P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1971); Norman v. World Wide
Distrib., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963). These deviations may be attributable to the fact that Article Three at one time employed an objective standard of good faith. U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(b) (1952 version) required the holder to be
"in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial standards of
any business in which the holder may be engaged." This objective standard is
usually traced to Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824).
See generally Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954); Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the
Subjective Test; 39 S.CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966).
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(where the lender knows the seller's business so well that the FTC now
requires the lender to bear the risk of seller misconduct), only in the
rarest situations will the lender be heard to claim that he did not know
he was taking consumer paper and thus did not know that the absent
FTC legend was required to be present. If the lender knowingly aids the
the FTC legend, certainly
seller's violations by purchasing paper without
78
he can never take the paper in good faith.
Finally, in addition to the irregularity-incompleteness and good faith
arguments, the consumer may find solace in the "real" defense of illegality. As mentioned in the introduction, certain real defenses such an
infancy, duress, misrepresentation as to the nature of the instrument,
insolvency, etc., are valid even against a holder in due course. Among
the real defenses announced in U.C.C. section 3-305 is "illegality of the
transaction as renders the obligation of the party a nullity." 70 The
seller's violation of the FTC rule by failing to include the legend in the
note may taint the whole credit transaction.8 0 The seller's unlawful
trade practice may rationally result in a court's treating the note like a
gambling debt-the source of numerous illegality cases. 8 1 Many
gambling debt cases have held that the innocent holder in due course
82
cannot enforce the note at all.
If the courts refuse to enforce any part of the debt by declaring a
note without the FTC legend to be unlawful, a windfall might go to the
debtor who may not have actually been injured by the failure of the
seller to incorporate the required legend. The buyer simply may be unable or unwilling to pay and have no meritorious defense against enforcement of the debt.8 3 Still, a court would apparently be empowered
to stand back and not lend its aid to the enforcement of this unlawful
78. A lender who knows of the seller's violations cannot be said to have
abided by the U.C.C.'s standard of "honesty in fact." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). Even
where the holder intentionally keeps himself ignorant of the details surrounding
a suspicious transaction, he may not be acting in good faith. See, e.g., Norman v.
World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
79. U.C.C. § 3-305 (2)(b).
80. U.C.C. § 3-305 generally is read as a deference to the law of the local
jurisdiction. See U.C.C. § 3-305, Comment 5; 2 R. ANDERSON, U.C.C. § 3-305.18
(1971). If the underlying transaction is considered to be "void ab initio" and not
merely "voidable," there can be no holder in due course status. See generally
Pacific Natl Bank v. Hernreich, 240 Ark. 114, 398 S.W.2d 221 (1966); Middle
Georgia Livestock Sales v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 123 Ga. App. 733, 182
S.E.2d 533 (1971); Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 932, § 28 (1969).
81. See, e.g., Moench v. Graff, 212 Ill. App. 42 (1918); Plank v. Swift, 187
Iowa 293, 174 N.W. 236 (1919); Dobbs v. Holder, 242 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. Ct. App.
1951); Gross v. Jacobson, 7 N.J. Misc. 851, 147 A. 380 (1929); Glassman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 210 Va. 650, 173 S.E.2d 843 (1970).
82. See cases cited note 81 supra.
83. Cf. Associate Credit Co. v. Nogic, 327 A.2d 740 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1974)
(the court allowed the consumer a windfall in order to enforce a statutory consumer protection scheme by holding that failure by the seller to include a three
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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contract.8 4 The deterrent effect occasioned by the courts' refusal to enforce nonlegend paper based on an illegality argument would be substantial. A lender simply would refuse to buy nonlegend paper if he
knew he could not turn to the courts to enforce his debt. The FTC rule
be served and vindicated by rewarding the undeconsequently would
8 5
serving consumer.
The refusal of the courts to enforce a note marred by illegal activity
is supported by U.C.C. section 2-302 which governs unconscionable
contracts. If it finds a contract unconscionable, "the court may refuse to
enforce the contract." 86 While the courts have not so used this draconian power, the comments reaffirm the authority of the court to refuse
any enforcement: "Under this section, the court, in its discretion, may
refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it is permeated by the unconscionability. ... ",87 If the law permits the courts to refuse to enforce an
unconscionable contract, the courts also ought to be permitted to refuse
enforcement of unlawful contracts.
If a court finds the nonlegend paper to be an unlawful contract but
chooses not to grant the consumer a possible windfall, then at a
minimum the lender ought to be denied holder in due course status and
the consumer's personal defenses should be heard. 8 However, if this
restrained use of the defense of illegality is employed, then the requirement of section 3-305 that the "illegality of the transaction [be such] as
renders the obligation of a party a nullity" (emphasis added) has not
been literally satisfied. If, through one contention or another (e.g., irregularity, incompleteness, good faith, illegality), the negotiable note
holder who is attempting to collect paper without the FTC legend is
denied holder in due course status, then U.C.C. section 3-306 comes into
play.8 9 Section 3-306 states that "[u]nless [the lender] has the rights of a
holder in due course [the lender] takes the instrument subject to ... all
day rescission notice required by the state Consumer Protection Act permitted
the borrower to completely avoid paying the lender).
84. See Massie v. Dudley, 173 Va. 42, 3 S.E.2d 176 (1939); Vedder v.
Spellman, 78 Wash. 2d 834, 480 P.2d 207 (1971).
85. Cf. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (a highly culpable debtor was awarded damages
from a more or less innocent violator of Federal Reserve Board Regulation T;,
the debtor won, not because he deserved to win, but because the creditor deserved to lose), noted in Note, 49 TEX. L. REv. 192 (1970).
86. U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
87. Id. Comment 2.
88. See Household Fin. Corp. v. Mowdy, 13 Ill. App. 3d 822, 300 N.E.2d 863
(1973) (the court permitted the consumer to assert a defense to payment even
though the notice provision required by the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act had
been omitted from the credit contract). Contra, Associate Credit Co. v. Nogic, 327
A.2d 740 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1974).
89. United States v. Second Nat'l Bank, 503 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927
(1976); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974).
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defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a simple
contract; .. ." The cases under this section illuminate the sort of de-

fenses the debtor can assert to reduce his liability. Just as the FTC staff
explained that the "claims and defenses" preserved by the FTC legend
were those which arose from the financed transaction,9" a majority of
courts under section 3-306 and its precursor, section 58 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, 91 have limited the debtor to defenses arising out of the financed transaction.92 A buyer's rights against the seller
which arise out of collateral transactions between the buyer and seller
are called "set-offs" and are not permitted to be asserted as a defense
against the lender. 93
While set-offs are not permitted, the defense of "failure of consid-

eration" specifically is permitted by section 3-306(c). That section has
been interpreted expansively to cover not only cases where the consumer
never received the goods, but also cases of breach of warranty. 94 Thus,
if the lender is not a holder in due course because the papers fail to bear
the FTC legend preserving the consumer's claims and defenses, under
U.C.C. section 3-306 the consumer will be able to resist paying the unpaid balance of the note when the seller does not perform at all, sells
unmerchantable goods, or renders faulty service. Therefore, the con-

sumer is protected against the collecting assignee of a negotiable note
even though the seller failed to incorporate the FTC legend.
90. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,024.
91. For cases under NIL § 58 holding that a holder not in due course is not
subject to an independent set-off, see, e.g., Manufacturers' Fin. Corp. v. VyeNeill Co., 62 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1933); Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co.,
163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (1934). See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R. 582 (1935).
92. For cases under U.C.C. § 3-306 holding that set-off is not a defense
against a holder not in due course, see, e.g., Bank of Wyandotte v. Woodrow, 394
F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Mo. 1975); United Overseas Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1974); Srochi v. Kamensky, 118 Ga. App. 182, 162 S.E.2d
889 (1968); Goldberg v. Rothman, 66 Misc. 2d 981, 322 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1971).
93. Set-off and recoupment, the common law forerunners of the modern day
counterclaims in equity practice, were based on the notion that one should not
be forced to pay what he will be able to recover. Recoupment was developed to
permit the defendant to demonstrate any facts arising out of the transaction
sued upon which might support an independent action in favor of the defendant
for the purpose of reducing the plaintiff's recovery. It was imperative that both
claims involve the same "subject matter" or arise out of the same "transaction."
However, where the defendant's claim arose out of a different transaction than
that sued upon by the plaintiff, he was compelled to bring a separate action. The
equity courts, in order to relieve this hardship on the defendant, began allowing
a "set-off" at an early date. To qualify for a set-off, the demands either had to be
liquidated or arise out of contract or judgment, be due the defendant in his own
right against the plaintiff or his assignor, and not be barred by the statute of
limitations. J. COUND, J. FRIENDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 505-06
(2d ed. 1974).
94. Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70 (N.D. 1972).
While the case spoke only of a breach of warranty that caused the consumer to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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If the seller includes a waiver of defense clause in non-negotiable
paper that does not contain the FTC legend preserving the consumer's
claims and defenses and the paper is then assigned to the lender, a
question arises as to the effect of the seller's violation of the FTC rule on
the lender's ability to collect. Section 9-206 of the U.C.C. regulates and
sanctions the use of a waiver of defense clause in suits by the assigneelender to collect from the debtor. However, the sanction is expressly
made "[s]ubject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods ...... 95

Although the FTC

rule is not a statute, violation of rule 433 does violate section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 96 Assuming that rule 433 is a "statute,"
the question is whether it is a "statute" contemplated by section 9-206.
Because section 9-206 applies only to suits by lenders against debtors
(not those by sellers against debtors), and rule 433 does not directly
apply to lenders, the courts should conclude that rule 433 is not the type
of statute contemplated by section 9-206, and that therefore rule 433
does not of itself preclude enforcement of waiver of defense clauses. If
rule 433 did directly regulate lenders, then it would be a statute which
protects buyers of consumer goods against lenders.
However, this does not mean that the consumer is now subject to
the oppressive waiver of defense clause. Section 9-206 also requires that
the lender take the non-negotiable paper given as consideration for
goods or services which contains the waiver of defense clause "in good
faith" without "notice of a claim or defense" before he can assert the
waiver. 97 The comments indicate that this is a reference to the relose his bargain, no limitation was announced by the court to deny the consumer
a defense that would permit him to refuse paying the unpaid balance based
solely on consequential business or personal property injury resulting from the
breach of warranty.
95. U.C.C. § 9-206(1). See note 17 supra.
96. Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 5, at 53,523. The Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), makes it an unlawful act to engage in any unfair and deceptive trade practice. Since rule 433 declares that it is
an unfair and deceptive trade practice to fail to include the legend in a consumer credit contract, violation of rule 433 violates § 5 of the FTC Act. See
generally Beltone Elec. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F. Supp. 590, 600-02 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
97. U.C.C. § 9-206(1). If a non-negotiable instrument containing a waiver of
defense clause is given as consideration for the sale of services, the lender who
takes the instrument by assignment must meet the good faith arguments of section 9-206 under both the 1962 version of Article Nine as well as the 1972
amendments. Under the 1962 code if the sale of services had not been performed at the time of assignment, it would be classed as a "contract right" because "right to payment under [the] contract [had] not yet [been] earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962 version). If the services had been performed at
the time of assignment, the obligation to pay is defined as an "account." U.C.C. §
9-106 (1962 version). If the non-negotiable instrument was accompanied by a
security agreement given for the sale of services, then the obligation is defined as
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quirements that must be met in order to become a holder in due course
of a negotiable note under section 3-302.9s Thus, the arguments already made concerning irregularity-incompleteness, good faith, and illegality, all of which deny the assignee of a negotiable note holder in due
course status or prevent his enforcement of the contract, are equally
applicable to the assignee of non-negotiable paper who is seeking to enforce a waiver of defense clause. 99, If the holder of a negotiable instrument not containing the legend does not qualify as a holder in due
course, similarly, the holder of a non-negotiable instrument which does
not contain the legend should not be permitted to assert a waiver of
defense clause.10 0
Once it is decided that the assignee of non-negotiable paper is not
protected by a waiver of defense clause, the consumer will be permitted
to assert his defenses to payment by operation of U.C.C. section
9-318.101 Like section 3-306 which governs the right of an assignee of a
chattel paper. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1962 version). See also U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962
version). Whether the non-negotiable paper is considered a contract right, an
account, or chattel paper, § 9-102(1)(a) and (b) provides that the paper is within
the scope of Article Nine. Thus, all three types of paper given for the sale of
services containing the waiver of defense clause are subject to the general obligation of § 9-206 which requires the assignee-lender to act in good faith. Under
the 1972 code, the definition of a "contract right" is merged into an "account."
U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972 version). Thus, an unperformed sale of services is now
considered an account. However, if the non-negotiable paper also contains a security interest, the paper is still considered "chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(b).
See also U.C.C. § 9-106. Section 9-102(1)(a) and (b) provides that Article Nine
governs both the sale of accounts and assignment of chattel paper. Therefore,
the assignment of a non-negotiable instrument given as consideration for the sale
of services, whether it be considered an account or chattel paper, will be governed by the good faith requirements of § 9-206.
98. U.C.C. § 9-206, Comment 1.
99. Ironically, the 1952 version of § 9-206 would have prevented enforcement of a waiver of defense clause. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (1952 version). See also
Hansford, The Holder-In-Due Course-An Endangered Species?, 37 ALA. LAW. 540,
542 (1976).
100. Courts confronted with the waiver of defense mechanism have rendered
it unenforceable in a number of ways other than as suggested in the text. Among
the most far-reaching decisions are those based on a public policy of preserving
consumer defenses and giving effect, via the U.C.C., to the doctrine of unconscionability. See San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220
P. 229 (1923); Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547
(1969); Dearborn Motors Credit Corp. v. Neel, 184 Kan. 437, 337 P.2d 992
(1959); Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958). See
also Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969) (because
the waiver of defense action is at law, the consumer was permitted to sue in
equity to rescind a contract due to the seller's breach of warranty).
101. U.C.C. § 9-318(1) provides:
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not
to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in
Section 9-206 the rights of an assignee are subject to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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negotiable note to collect from the consumer,' 0 2 section 9-318(1)(a) permits the consumer to assert against the assignee of non-negotiable paper
any defense arising out of "the contract between the [consumer] and
[seller]." Thus, there is also a "same transaction" requirement in a waiver
of defense clause case. However, unlike section 3-306, the consumer also
is permitted under section 9-318 to assert a "set-off' (a defense to payment arising out of a transaction unrelated to the financed transaction)
provided that the set-off "accrues before [the consumer] receives notifica03
tion of the assignment."'

(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and
assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the
assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment.
Section 9-318 of both the original code and the 1972 version governs most
of these cases due to the expansive definition of "account" under § 9-106. Section 9-318 governs the rights of the lender and consumer where there has been
an assignment of an "account." "'Account' means any right to payment for
goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance."
U.C.C. § 9-106. Thus, § 9-318 will govern all consumer credit transactions except
those which involve an "instrument" or "chattel paper." Section 9-105(1)(i) defines instrument as a "negotiable instrument." Therefore, § 3-306 will control
those cases. "Chattel paper" is defined as "a writing or writings which evidence
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods
.... " U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b). Thus, § 9-318 does not govern a consumer credit
contract which contains both a waiver of defense clause and a security agreement. Since there is no code provision governing the rights of the lender and
the consumer over chattel paper, non-code law must determine the consumer's
ability to assert a defense. Section 168(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 1973) provides that the consumer can assert any
claim or defense which "accrues" before his notification of the assignment to the
lender. The term "accrues" has been interpreted to include any defense or claim
which arose as a part of the transaction between the consumer and the seller.
Thus, the consumer will be permitted to assert all claims and defenses which
arise out of the contract which was assigned. As for defenses that did not arise
out of the financial transaction, the lender may give the consumer notice of the
assignment and thereby cut off defenses which the consumer may assert against
the seller and which arise in the future. Since the present wording of § 9-318 is
based on § 168(2) of the Restatement (see authorities cited note 146 infra) it is not
surprising that the two sections yield identical results.
Section 9-106 under the 1962 code defined "account" in the same way as §
9-106 under the 1972 code, except that a right which had not been "earned by
performance" was excluded from this definition and given the separate definition of "a contract right." Thus, an unperformed sale of services was a "contract
right" under the 1962 code. If the seller assigns this type of consumer credit
contract, the legal relationship between the lender and consumer also will be
governed by § 168(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS.
102. See section II(A)(2)(a) supra.

103. U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(b).
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c. The Direct Loan
When the consumer goes directly to the lender and negotiates a
loan which is thus separate from his sales contract with the seller, it must
be determined what rights to defeat collection are possessed by the consumer when the loan papers fail to bear the FTC legend. It is important
to remember that the direct lender will not be seeking to enforce a contract that has been breached by either the seller or the lender. By
definition, a direct loan means that the lender and the consumer are the
only formal parties to the note, and the lender will have performed fully
the moment he gave the money to the consumer. 10 4 The truly independent direct lender can honestly claim that whatever the consumer
does with the money is the consumer's business, and if the consumer
gets into a bad deal with a merchant who is unrelated to the direct
lender, it is of no concern to the lender. Many cases have made the
obvious point that the seller's breach of his sales contract does not put
05
the unrelated direct lender in breach of his loan contract.
Unlike the assignee lender, the direct lender does not attempt to
enforce the seller's breached contract and has no need to prove himself
a holder in due course or beneficiary of a waiver of defense clause. The
direct lender simply has no need to cut off the consumer's claims and
defenses against the seller because those defenses do not exist against

104. See text accompanying note 19 supra; note 105 infra.
105. See United States v. McCulloch, 26 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) where the
consumers used the direct loan proceeds to install an oil burner. The court was
prompted to say: "The difficulty with the (consumers'] position is that because of
some real or fancied defect in the oil burner which they purchased, they desire
to avoid payment of the note which they gave to a third party to enable them to
buy a burner. The [lender] was not the seller of the oil burner and made no
representations in respect to the oil burner." Id. at 8. Thus, the court permitted
the lender to recover on the note. See also United States v. Warshaw, 61 F. Supp.
678 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Stringer, 44 Idaho 599, 258 P.
522 (1927) (loan); Farmer's Savings Bank v. Grange, 199 Iowa 978, 203 N.W. 37
(1925) (loan); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 1971)
(loan); Wood v. Morgan Bros., 135 So. 2d 692, 695 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (note
given as consideration for services rendered); Ohio Loan & Discount Co. v.
Tyarks, 173 Ohio 564, 184 N.E.2d 374 (1962) (loan); First Nat'l Bank v. Somers,
38 S.D. 96, 160 N.W. 523 (1916) (loan).
In a case decided under the U.C.C., the maker of a note sought to avoid
payment on the ground that the lender and the third-party contractor, who allegedly received the proceeds of the loan, were in fact the same party. Thus, the
maker argued that he should be able to defend the lender's action on the note
by raising defenses he had against the third-party contractor. The court sent the
matter back for further evidence on the question whether the lender and the
third-party contractor were the same entity. Thereby, the court impliedly held
that if the lender and the third-party contractor were separate entities the maker
could not burden the lender's right to payment with the maker's claims and
defenses against the contractor. See Behrens v. Apessos, 39 Mich. App. 426, 197
N.W.2d 886 (1972).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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the direct lender. If the FTC legend is included in the loan papers, the
direct lender will have agreed to make his loan "subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller .... " However,
what are the consumers' rights when the legend is missing, but should
have been incorporated due to a referral or affiliation connection between the direct lender and seller?
One excellent source of consumer protection in this situation may be
found in the "overriding and super-eminent principle" 106 of good faith.
Section 1-203 of the U.C.C. with a grand sweep provides that "[Le]very
contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." The standard of good faith for lenders is
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 107 If the direct lender knows, as he certainly will in most cases, that he is dealing
with a customer of a seller with whom the lender has an "affiliation" or
"referral" relationship, then in the authors' view, the direct lender must
incorporate the FTC legend in order to honor his obligation of good
faith.
When a consumer walks into E-Z Finance to get a loan, he certainly
will have to fill out a loan application form. E-Z will inquire into the
purpose of the loan, if for no other reason than to acquire a security
interest if goods are to be purchased. When the consumer tells E-Z's
loan officer that he is going to use the money to buy a sofa from Sticks
Furniture, the loan officer will then know (because he surely knows
whether Sticks and E-Z do business together) whether the loan papers
should contain the FTC legend. If Sticks and E-Z are related to each
other in such a way as to activate rule 433, then E-Z is acting in bad faith
when it aids Sticks' violation of rule 433 by failing to include the legend.
We accept as a matter of faith that if honesty means anything, it means
avoiding the knowing participation in a conspiracy to violate federal
law. 10 8 Of course, the lender would not violate the FTC rule, but he
would have aided and abetted the seller's violation and thereby would
106. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963).
107. U.C.C. § 1-201(19). See note 77 supra.
108. Cf. Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc.) 503
F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974), where a seller of goods was not permitted to assert his
security interest against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. Although the seller
had filed his security interest under the debtor's legally correct name at the time
of sale, the seller knew the debtor was about ready to undergo a name change.
Thus, the seller tried to mislead future creditors who would not be able to locate
the security interest by a check under the debtor's new name. The court noted
that "a realization that another is unaware of something or does not understand
it may be considered as not conforming to the good faith standard of the Code."
Id. at 1222, quoting King, Policy Decisions and Security Agreements Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 556, 561 (1963).
If, in a rule 433 situation, the lender knows he is participating in a trick to
deny the ignorant consumer of his claims and defenses, then it is more than
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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have violated the obligation of good faith required of direct lenders.
When the requisite connection exists between the seller and lender, such
that the seller violates the FTC rule by taking the proceeds of a direct
loan that did not include the FTC legend, there is a high probability that
the lender knows he is participating in a scheme to deprive the consumer of what would otherwise be his preserved rights. 10 9
If the direct lender is declared to have violated his obligation
of good faith, what is the sanction to be imposed? A sanction specifically
mentioned in the U.C.C. for the assignment situation is that the assignee-lender who does not demonstrate his good faith will be denied
holder in due course status and also will not be permitted to claim rights
under a waiver of defense clause.11 0 Because the direct lender does not
need to be a holder in due course or the beneficiary of a waiver of
defense clause, this sanction is useless in the direct loan context. 1
An appropriate sanction for the direct lender's bad faith in failing to
incorporate the FTC legend would be to treat the direct loan as if the
FTC legend had been incorporated. If good faith demands the FTC
legend's incorporation, then this remedy corrects the bad faith. With the
FTC legend judicially placed in the loan papers, the consumer will be
able to assert his defenses to collection, which arose from the seller's
breach of his sales contract against the direct lender in the lender's suit
to recover the unpaid balance.
The net result under this analysis will be to subject all bad faith
lenders, both direct and assignee, to the consumer's defenses even
though the FTC legend is missing. If the lender is an assignee, his bad
faith will result in denial of holder in due course status or of benefits
under a waiver of defense clause, thereby subjecting him to the consumer's defenses arising from the breached sales contract. If the lender
makes the loan directly, his bad faith should allow a court to reform the
arguable that the lender is acting in bad faith. The Kalamzoo case was followed in
King v. Williams (In re Conger Printing Co., Inc.), 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 224 (D.
Or. 1975).
109. Dictum in Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v. Beebe, 123 Vt. 317, 321, 187
A.2d 502, 505 (1963) suggests that if the direct lender had known of the seller's
misconduct, then the lender would have been unable to collect from the defrauded customer.
Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876(b) (1939) ("For harm resulting to a third
person from tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he ... knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ...
110. See sections II(B)(1), II(B)(2) supra.
111. For various theories to hold the direct lender liable in situations not
specifically concerned with failure to incorporate the FTC legend, see Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1972). See also

TPO, Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973); Ryan v. Ryan, 298 A.2d 343
(Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Lewis v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 139 Ga. App.
855, 229 S.E.2d 765 (1976), where the direct lender was unable to collect in his
suit on the negotiable note.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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contract by constructively placing the FTC legend in the loan papers,
thus burdening 2 the loan with the buyer's defenses arising from the
1
seller's breach."
B. Consumer Claims Against the Lender
The preceding section II (A) supra dealt with the consumer's ability
to assert a defense against the lender in order to reduce the consumer's
obligation to repay the outstanding balance of the note. This section will
deal with the consumer's ability to assert claims against the lender in
order to recover payments already made.
1. Legend Paper
The lender who loans money pursuant to a consumer credit contract that contains the FTC clause stating "Any holder of this consumer
credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor
could assert against the seller... "113 has contractually obligated himself
to stand in the shoes of the seller. When the rule works and the legend
is included in the consumer credit contract, the lender in effect has
agreed to let the buyer assert his claims against him. Mercifully, only in
cases discussed infra involving down-payments and trade-ins will it make
11 4
a difference whether the lender acquires the contract by assignment
112. One court has achieved the results suggested in the direct lender-good
faith situation by mistakenly treating the direct lender as an assignee lender. In
Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1973) a seller
of home improvements steered his ghetto customers to a number of savings and
loan associations who made the loans directly to the customers. Due to the unconscionable prices charged by the seller, the customers sued as a class to rescind
the notes held by the direct lenders as well as to recover payments already made.
Incredibly, the direct lender claimed that the reason he could enforce the notes
was because he was a holder in due course. The trial court snapped up this plea
and responded by declaring that the direct lenders were not holders in due
course because they had operated in bad faith. The direct lenders, according to
the court, intentionally kept themselves ignorant, in the face of very suspicious
circumstances, of the unconscionable prices charged by the seller. In turn, the
court reformed all the notes so as to have them reflect only the true value of the
work performed by the seller. Some got money back, some had reduced payments. On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit reversed on the issue of good
faith. 538 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181
N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970), where a direct lender's fraud prevented his collection
of the unpaid balance. This very fair and sound result is to be encouraged, but
future courts and litigants should recognize that the direct lender is not trying to
cut off defenses to the enforcement of his note because there is no defense to be
cut off. If courts desire to protect the consumer against the direct lender who is
connected with the seller, they can do so by requiring the lender to act in good
faith and remedying the direct lender's bad faith by judicially imposing the
legend into the loan agreement.
113. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977) (emphasis added).
114. Prior sections to this paper have drawn a distinction between a lender
who is assigned a negotiable note and is asserting holder in due course status
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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or makes a direct loan. The FTC legend is essentially the same in both
cases, and the contractual rights of the consumer to assert a refund
claim against the lender should be identical in most cases. If the FTC
legend is in the loan papers, the lender will have more or less consented
to return the debtor's payments if the debtor has a valid claim against
the seller.
While liability may be the same in both the assignment and direct
loan contexts, there are still perplexing and unanswered questions with
respect to the consumer's ability to recover the payments made. An
example may aid the analysis. Consumer buys a new dunebuggy from
Seller for a price of $6,000. Consumer trades in his old buggy for a
credit of $2,000 on the purchase price and pays an additional $1,000
cash down-payment. Consumer's negotiable note with a balance due of
$3,000, to be repaid in installments over a three-year period, is then
assigned by Seller to Lender. The note contained the FTC legend:
Notice. Any holder of this credit contract is subject to all claims
and defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of
goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder."'
Seller warrants the dunebuggy against defects in materials and workmanship for five years, but after only six months, the dunebuggy is
completely destroyed by a fire caused by a leaking, defective gas tank.
The fire causes no other damage. At the time of the fire, Consumer had
paid $500 in installments to Lender with $450 applied to principal and
$50 applied to interest.
As previously indicated, Lender will have waived what might have
otherwise been his holder in due course status or his ability to rely on a
waiver of defense clause if the FTC legend is in the loan papers. 110
Consequently, Consumer will be able to assert the defense of Seller's
breach of warranty to defeat Lender's suit to collect the remaining
$2,500 balance. However, Consumer is not satisfied with just the right to
cease making payments but also wants to recover the $500 of installment
payments, the $1,000 cash down-payment, and the $2,000 trade-in.
There is no question whether Consumer will be permitted to recover the
$450 that was applied to principal. Seller's breach is directly related to
the financed transaction and Lender will have to give Consumer his
money back." 7 Because the legend states that the recovery against the
and the lender who is assigned a non-negotiable note which contains a waiver of
defense clause. Since the FTC rule requires the same legend be placed in both
types of contracts, the contractual rights and obligations of the consumer and
lender will be the same and there is no need to treat the cases separately in this
section.
115. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
116. See notes 95-103 and accompanying text supra.
117. See sections II(A)(1), II(A)(2)(a) supra.
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lender "shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor,"' 18 there is no
problem raised by recovery of the $450. As the $50 interest also was
paid under the contract, there should be no hesitation on the part of the
19
courts to allow Consumer to recover it as well.
The FTC staff suggests that recovery of the down-payment and
trade-in depends upon whether an assignment or a direct loan is involved. The Staff Guidelines provide that a down-payment should be
included in the consumer's potential recovery if the lender acquires the
consumer credit contract by assignment from the seller but should be
excluded if the consumer credit contract is acquired by a direct loan. 2 °
Both legends (that for assignments and that for direct loans) contain
identical language: "Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed
amounts paid by the debtor hereunder." 1 2' In the case of an assignment, the down-payment is made to the seller pursuant to the consumer
credit contract. Because the assignee-lender later holds that same contract,
the down-payment made thereunder can be recovered as part of the
consumer's claim against the lender. The consumer will not be able to
recover the down-payment made to the seller in the direct loan situation
because the down-payment would not have been made pursuant to the
22
direct loan contract with the lender.
This distinction between direct loans and assignments is made all the
more significant by realizing that there is no fundamental distinction
between trade-ins and down-payments. If a down-payment is "paid" in
an assignment situation, then there is no reason to assume that a
trade-in should be treated differently. Therefore, in an assignment case
the lender will be liable for all that the consumer has given up in purchasing the goods or services, and the lender's potential liability will exceed, in many cases, the amount he has received from the consumer.
Caveat cessionarius.
A change in the dunebuggy hypothetical illuminates problems other
than with trade-ins and down-payments. Assume that there has been no
down-payment or trade-in, but that installment payments in the amount
of $500 have been made. The dunebuggy fire on this occasion does
$200 damage to the dunebuggy's paint job, causes the consumer's garage
to burn down, and results in personal injuries. The garage damage totals
$5,000 and the consumer suffers $10,000 in personal injuries. There is
little question that the consumer could recover $200 of his payments to
118. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
119. An extended search failed to reveal an official FTC comment on interest.
An FTC attorney who handles rule 433 problems said that the reason there is no
comment is that because it was so obvious that "paid hereunder" included interest, the staff had never thought to comment. Telephone interview with Walter
Diercks (Oct. 11, 1977).
120. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,023.
121. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
122. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,023.
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pay the cost of a new paint job for the dunebuggy. 123 The real issue
raised is whether he could recover up to an additional $300 (thereby
reaching the limits of the amounts paid under the consumer credit contract) 124 to at least partially compensate him for the damage to his garage and person. The FTC staff has said that the rule "does apply to all
claims or defenses connected with the transaction whether in tort or
contract." 125 As there is no indication that consequential damages are
not "claims," the consumer could recover an additional $300 from the
lender.
A final question is raised by cases where the warranty period is
longer than the repayment period. The FTC legend preserving the consumer's claims and defenses adds nothing to the substantive law and reference must be made to state law to determine what constitutes a good
claim or defense.12 6 Consequently, if a statute of limitations has run on
the claim, or the period of the warranty has expired, the consumer
would have no recognized claim or defense when the goods fail, even
though he is still in debt to the lender. The consumer may be unhappy
but if he has no recognized claim or defense, inclusion of the FTC
legend will not aid his recovery.
But what of the converse situation where the consumer has a good
claim, but he has already paid off the lender? In the hypothetical case, if
the dunebuggy fire occurred after four years of use by the consumer,
i.e., a year after the lender had been totally paid off and the note had
been marked paid in full and returned to the consumer, the question is
whether the consumer would have any claim for recovery. An astute
attorney for the lender might argue that the consumer has no claim to
recover payments from the lender because the lender is no longer "a
holder of a consumer credit contract." 1 27 A holder is defined in
the
28
If
U.C.C. as "a person who is in possession ... of an instrument."
123. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) sets forth a general rule for determining the damages
suffered by a consumer when accepted goods do not live up to their warranty.
The general measure of damages is the difference between the value of the
goods accepted and their value had they been as warranted. However, where the
true damage is the repair cost, § 2-714(1) permits damages to be determined "in
any manner which is reasonable" and § 2-714(2) permits damages to be determined in a different manner if there are "special circumstances." Therefore, the
fire loss probably would be determined by the amount of the repair bill instead
of by an attempt to determine hypothetically different values.
124. In addition to U.C.C. § 2-715 (which permits recovery for consequential
damage to person or property caused by breach of warranty), RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) permits recovery of damages for physical
harm to person or property from one who sells a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous condition.
125. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 20,024.
126. Id. at 20,023. See note 66 supra for a general outline of the claims and

defenses that accrue to a consumer of goods.
127. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
128. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
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the lender no longer is in possession of the note, as he would not be if
the note had been paid off and surrendered to the consumer, then arguably the time has passed for him to respond to the consumer's claims.
However, an FTC staff member has stated that the lender's liability is
coextensive with the length of the seller's warranty liability. 12 9 The FTC
contention is that once the lender touches the consumer credit contract,
he obligates himself to return the consumer's payments whenever the
seller would be liable to the consumer.13 0 The wording of the legend
does not indicate whether the lender must be a holder at the time of suit
or whether he simply must have been a holder any time before suit.
Thus the issue cannot be resolved by a reading of the rule.
2. Paper Not Containing the Required Legend
a. Holder In Due Course
As section II(A)(2)(a) supra indicated, the holder of a negotiable instrument may not qualify as a holder in due course when the note fails
to bear the FTC legend. This results in the consumer being able to asAt
sert his defenses against collection under U.C.C. section 3-306.' 1
issue is whether the consumer also will be able to recover payments he
has already made from a holder not in due course when the FTC legend
is missing. Section 3-306 only permits the assertion of "claims to [the
instrument]," 131 i.e., claims to recover the instrument or proceeds that
were stolen, forged, or altered.' 3 3 In cases where the consumer does
not get what he bargained for, the consumer's relief under section 3-306
is limited to asserting a defense to defeat the lender's suit to collect the
34
unpaid balance.
By only permitting the consumer to raise defenses, section 3-306
may imply that the lender is protected from affirmative liability. A
number of knowledgeable commentators have stated that the assigneelender's exposure is limited to the unpaid balance of the loan.1 35 The
little court authority available supports the notion that the assignee of a

129. Letter from Rachel Shao, Attorney, FTC Division of Compliance, to Darrell Dunham (June 20, 1977).
130. The staff expressed concern that a lender may be able to avoid the rule
simply by having the consumer sign a series of term notes. Thus, the consumer
would never be able to recover his payments because the lender would surrender
each note after the consumer's payment.
131. See section II(A)(2)(a) supra.
132. U.C.C. § 3-306(a).
133. U.C.C., § 3-306, Comment 2 states: "'All valid claims to it on the part of
any person' includes not only claims of legal title, but all liens, equities, or other
claims of right against the instrument or its proceeds." (Emphasis added).
134. See cases cited note 92 supra.
135. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions:Requiem, Revival, or
Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 503, 554 (1975). Rohner relied on 2 G. GiLPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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negotiable note is not affirmatively liable. For instance, in Standard Insulation & Window Co. v. Dorrel1136 the assignee of a negotiable note sued to

collect and was met with a counterclaim that the maker had made an
overpayment to the assignor. The court held that the assignee was not a
holder in due course because it took the note with knowledge that it was
overdue, and consequently, the assignee was subject to the maker's defenses but was not liable for the overpayment.
However, there appears to be no good reason to deny affirmative
liability when the assignee of a negotiable note actively participates in the
sale and thus may be in violation of his obligation to act in good faith
imposed in the U.C.C." 37

There is a case that imposes affirmative lia-

bility on the bad faith, closely-connected assignee of a negotiable note. In
Gross v. Appelgren 138 a referral scheme to sell Tappan ranges was set up
by attorneys who also represented Metropolitan Industrial Bank. Negotiable notes were taken by the seller and assigned to the bank. The customers of the seller were defrauded in various ways, and after a number
of payments were made to the bank, the customers sued to rescind the
notes and recover their payments. The Colorado Supreme Court first
held that the bank could not have acted in good faith because it was so
closely connected with the seller.' 39 Therefore, the bank was denied
MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

1091-92 (1965), where Profes-

sor Gilmore stated:

Between buyer and seller the unsoundness of [the goods and services] would be available both as defenses and as claims. If seller sued
for the price, buyer would plead breach of warranty or failure of consideration as a defense, but buyer could also sue seller (or bring a

counterclaim in the seller's action) to recover a down payment or any
damages that resulted from the breach. Between buyer and seller's assignee, however, the breach of warranty or failure of consideration is
available only defensively; if buyer wishes to recover his down payment
or his damages, he must go directly against the seller. The assignee,
who comes in to finance the transaction, does not thereby become responsible for the assignor's warranties or prospective performance.
Professor Gilmore was referring to non-negotiable notes under Article 9, but
there is no suggestion that the idea is not so applied to negotiable notes. See also
80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Counterclaim § 61 e (1953) ("IJ]udgment cannot be rendered
against the assignee for the excess. [Borrower] is entitled to use his claim defensively, and not offensively.").
136. 309 S.W.2d 701 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958). See also Golding v. Veal, 191 Misc.
210, 77 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Cf. Household Finance Corp. v. Mowdy,
13 Ill. App. 3d 822, 300 N.E.2d 863 (1973) (court in dictum expressly limited
buyers' rights of action under § 20 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to the
amount owing on the debt assigned).
137. As discussed in section II(A)(2)(c), all lenders are under the obligation to
act in good faith.
138. 467 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1970).
139. A number of courts have held that the assignee-lender who is closely
connected to the seller cannot as a matter of law be a holder in due course, but
none of these cases imposed affirmative liability. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co.
v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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holder in due course status. However, the court did not stop there. It
also ruled, with no discussion, that the bank would have to return the
payments already made.
When the assignee of a negotiable note not containing the required
legend knows that he is helping the seller violate rule 433, he ought to
be declared to be acting in bad faith.140 Under U.C.C. section 3-302,
the bad faith will result in the lender being denied holder in due course
status and therefore subject him to the buyer's defenses via section
3-306. In addition, if the consumer has a justified claim for a refund,
the court ought to correct the violation of the lender's good faith obligation by judicially introducing the FTC legend into the loan. Under the
reconstituted loan, the consumer then could assert his claim for recovery
of the payments he already made. Nowhere in the U.C.C. does it say
that bad faith can serve only as a shield. On the contrary, cases involving
bad faith sellers under Article Two have resulted in affirmative liability
being imposed.1

41

b. Waiver of Defense Clause
If the lender purchases non-negotiable paper not containing the
FTC legend and attempts to assert a waiver of defense clause, the
analysis set forth in section II (A)(2)(b) supra indicated that U.C.C. section 9-206 will not authorize the waiver's use. If the buyer can therefore
raise his defenses under section 9-318,142 can he also assert his claims to
recovery of the payments already made when the FTC legend is absent?
Unlike section 3-306, which regulates holders not in due course of
negotiable instruments and specifically authorizes only the assertion of
defenses, section 9-318 appears to permit an affirmative recovery. Section 9-318(1)(a) not only makes the lender's rights "subject to any claim
arising" from the contract between the consumer and the seller, i.e.,
claims relating to the financed transaction, but also permits a consumer's
unrelated claim against the seller to be asserted against the lender if this
unrelated claim arose prior to the consumer receiving notice of the assignment.
14 3
However, Professor Gilmore, one of the draftsmen of this section,
has written that consumers are not authorized under this section to seek
Orange Count , Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Jones v.
Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (court specifically left the question open).

140. See note 109 supra.
141. Baker v. Ratzlaff, 564 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1977). See, e.g., Columbus Milk
Producers Coop. v. Department of Agriculture, 48 Wis. 2d 451, 180 N.W.2d 617
(1970). See also Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan, 361 F. Supp. 590
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 538 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trial court required the bad
faith direct lender, considered by the judge to be just like an assignee of a
negotiable note, to return the excess payments made).
142. See note 101 supra for text of § 9-318.
143. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (1972).
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affirmative relief from the lender, 4 4 and the cases support this assertion.1 45 Professor Gilmore states that section 9-318 permits "claims" to
be asserted by the consumer only in the limited context of a defense to a
suit by the lender and only for the amount of the judgment. 46 Therefore, section 9-318 as glossed by Professor Gilmore and the courts oper4
ates like section 3-306.' 7
However, just as in the case of a bad faith assignee of a negotiable
note,'

48

the holder of non-negotiable paper who has violated his obliga-

tion of good faith by participating in a scheme to deprive the consumer
of his FTC rights ought to be required to return the consumer's payments (assuming, of course, that the consumer has a justified refund
claim).
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Brown 149 illustrates the point that
where the lender is not a remote financier but participates in bringing
about the harm, he will be made affirmatively liable. A farm implement
manufacturer purchased non-negotiable paper from a dealer who sold a
combine to a farmer and took in trade the farmer's old combine. The
non-negotiable paper contained a waiver of defense clause. The manufacturer-lender's representative had been present at the sale and had
assured the farmer that the dealer would honor his promise to service
the combine. The combine broke down, the dealer went out of business,
and the manufacturer-lender sued to collect the unpaid balance. The
farmer counterclaimed to recover the value of his trade-in. The Montana Supreme Court held that the manufacturer-lender was so close to
the transaction that he could not be said to have taken the paper without
notice of a defense as required by U.C.C. section 9-206. Moreover, the
lender's participation not only prevented his collection but also
prompted the court to remand the case for a hearing on the counterclaim.'

50

144. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 41.5 (1965);
Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J.
217, 230 (1964).

145. See, e.g., James Talcott, Inc. v. Brewster Sales Corp., 355 N.Y.S.2d 320

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Pendarvis v. General Motors Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Haverluk, 130 N.W.2d 616
(N.D. 1964). See also Iselin-Jefferson Financial v. Makel Textiles, Inc., 250 N.Y.S.
2d 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
146. See authorities cited note 144 supra.
147. There are unique cases which will be governed by non-Code law as illustrated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 168(2) (Tent. Drafts Nos.
1-7, 1971), but the results will be the same as those achieved under U.C.C. §
9-318. See note 101 supra.
148. See section II(B)(2)(a) supra.
149. 547 P.2d 846 (Mont. 1976).

150. The Colorado Supreme Court has provided the only other case that
permitted an affirmative recovery by the consumer from an assignee of a nonhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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The consumer's claim for refund is even stronger when the lender
acts in bad faith by purchasing non-negotiable paper without the required legend from a seller who later defaults. There is simply no reason to protect the bad faith lender from the consumer's justified claims
for refund. If the lender breaches his duty of good faith by participating
in what amounts to a conspiracy to aid the seller's violation of federal
law, the lender cannot, in good conscience, claim that he expected to be
able to retain the benefits of the conspiracy.
c. The Direct Loan
When the consumer goes directly to the lender and there is thus no
note to be assigned, can the buyer get his money back when the goods
or services prove to be shoddy? If the direct lender's bad faith in failing
to include the FTC legend can render his loan uncollectible as indicated
in section II(A)(2)(c) supra, then his bad faith ought to prevent his retention of the consumer's payments if the consumer has a justified claim
for refund. When the direct lender knowingly aids the seller's violation
of rule 433 and thereby attempts to deprive the consumer of his claims
and defenses against the direct lender, the courts should remedy the bad
faith exclusion of the legend by treating the loan as if the legend were
present. Conversely, when the direct lender does not participate in the
seller's violation of the FTC rule, the direct lender ought to be isolated
from both the consumer's claims and the consumer's defenses.
Two direct loan cases nicely illustrate the point that the direct
lender's degree of participation in injuring the consumer determines his
affirmative liability to the consumer.
In Blackwell v. Midland Federal Savings & Loan Association 151 home
buyers borrowed directly from the savings and loan company and then
negotiable note. In Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. DeLozier, 496 P.2d 1016 (Colo.
1972), a sub-contractor, as security for a loan, assigned his rights to payment
under the construction contract to the lender. The general contractor was
notified of the assignment and paid the lender for the work that the sub-contractor was to do. However, the sub-contractor did not perform. The Colorado
court permitted the general contractor to recover the payment from the totally
innocent lender.
The court quoted from Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217, 235, n.35 (1964-65): "[W]here the assignor fails
to perform the contract, the assignee cannot retain mistaken or even negligent
payments made to it by the [debtor] unless there has been a subsequent change

of position." 496 P.2d at 1018-19. While the Colorado court may have viewed
this as a restitution case, i.e., a case where the creditor has "extra" money and

should not be allowed to keep it, this was not the situation. The creditor in
DeLozier had loaned good money to the sub-contractor, and therefore had a good
reason to keep the debtor-general contractor's payment. This is not a case where
there is loose money floating around. DeLozier is truly a case where the financer
was made affirmatively liable to the debtor. It is not a mistaken payment-restitu-

tion case.
151. 132 Colo. 20, 284 P.2d 1060 (1955).
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engaged a contractor to build a house. The lender was not obligated to
inspect the house, nor did the court mention any connection at all between the lender and builder. After six years of occupancy, the buyer
sued both the lender and contractor for damages occasioned by the
faulty construction of the house. The ubiquitous Supreme Court of Colorado denied the buyer's affirmative claims and affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the lender.
On the other hand, in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association 152 the lender actively participated in a home construction project
where many of the homes contained major structural defects. The
lender financed the builder's acquisition of the land and construction of
the houses and helped plan the entire subdivision development. Great
Western also directly loaned the funds to acquire the homes to some of
the home purchasers. 15 3 When the purchasers sued Great Western for
damages, i.e., the imposition of affirmative liability, and recission, Justice
Traynor declared that the lender had a duty of reasonable care to protect the purchasers of the homes from damages caused by faulty construction.

154

In a rule 433 situation when the direct lender and seller are connected by a referral or affiliation relationship, the requisite foundation
has been laid for lender bad faith liability. If there is no connection
between the direct lender and seller, the rule does not apply. Thus, the
direct lender would not be aiding and abetting the seller's violation of
the rule by failing to incorporate the legend. Simply put, if the lender
helps cheat the consumer, good faith provides the authority to make him
pay.'

55

III. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that when the FTC legend is
missing, the consumer's claims and defenses will rest principally on the
not too certain foundation of good faith. The seller may be subject to

152. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
153. From the lower court opinion, it appears that Great Western held almost
all the first mortgages on the homes. Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1967).
154. The courts do not grant immunity to direct lenders from counterclaims
simply because the lender is suing on a negotiable note. See, e.g., Seymour Water
Co. v. Horischak, 149 Conn. 435, 181 A.2d 112 (1962); Pacific Coast Capital
Corp. v. Research to Realty, Inc., 57 Mich. App. 75, 225 N.W.2d 177 (1974);
Susan Ives, New York, Ltd. v. Base Lodge, Inc., 359 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct.
1974); Hemphill v. Greater Houston Bank, 537, S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Ct. App.
1976).
155. See note 141 supra. For cases where affirmative liability has been placed
on the bad faith insurer, see The Tort of Bad Faith: A Perspective Look at the Insurer's Expanding Liability, 8 Cum. L. REv. 241 (1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/2
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quite stringent remedies now available to the FTC 156 but the lender will
go on his way unregulated unless the courts take the pains to construct a
theory of liability.
Of course, an aggressive court could rationally declare that in order
to advance the public policy protecting consumers, henceforth lenders
will be treated as if the FTC legend were in the loan papers. By judicial
fiat, and without a troublesome inquiry into the labyrinth of the U.C.C.,
all the problems raised in this article could be eliminated. There is a
persuasive analogy to suggest such a judicial tour de force. As mentioned
before, a number of courts have declared that a lender who is closely
connected to the seller cannot ever be a holder in due course even
though the formal requirements of section 3-302 (that the lender take
for value, in good faith, and without notice of a defense) have been
complied with. 5 ' This judicial amendment to the U.C.C. was made and
has been hailed as necessary to protect the hapless consumer. 15
Another technique that has been suggested to avoid tying the fate of
the consumer to the lawfulness of the seller is the creation of an implied
right of action. The idea is for a court to imply a cause of action in favor
of the consumer against the lender for the seller's violation of rule
433.159 Indeed, there is authority for implication of a civil remedy in
favor of a consumer injured as a result of violation of an outstanding
FTC cease and desist order. 60 However, the implied cause of action
ran against the violator of the cease and desist order, not against some
third party. In a rule 433 situation, the seller is the violator, but the
implied cause of action is to run against the ender who has violated no
FTC rule. As the seller is already civilly liable to the consumer for his
breach of contract, 1 6 implication of a cause of action against the seller
for his violation of rule 433 does the consumer no good. To advance the

156. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975) which provides remedies of rescission or reformation of contracts, refund of purchase money, return of property,
payment of damages and public notification of rule violations.
157. See authorities cited notes 16 and 139 supra.
158. See authorities cited notes 16 and 139 supra.
159. See Note, Implied Consumer Remedy Under FTC Trade Regulations RuleCoup De GraceDealt Holder in Due Course?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 876, 904-14 (1977).
160. The most notable case in this regard is Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the
Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). But see Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers
Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For other cases holding against private
enforcement, see Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); Atlanta
Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tex. 1942). For a general discussion of
a plaintiffs right to imply a cause of action under the FTC Act, see Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of PrivateEnforcement Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 274 (1975); Comment, Consumer Protection-FederalTrade Commission Act-Private Right of Action for Enforcement of Cease
and Desist Orders May be Implied Under Federal Trade Commission Act, 8 RuT.-CAM.
L.J. 353 (1977).
161. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711,-714,-715.
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idea of implying a cause of action against the lender really amounts to
nothing more than urging the courts to do for the FTC what the FTC
did not do for itself.
The strength of these arguments hopefully lies in pointing out to
the courts, litigants, commentators, and the FTC, how rule 433 operates
in conjunction with the U.C.C. These arguments can permit a "strict
constructionist" judge, in good conscience, to grant the consumer all that
he would have gotten had the seller not violated the rule. No broad
policy ground need be broken, no blind assumptions need be made; a
court only has to require lenders to act in good faith as required by the
U.C.C. and thereby arrive at a socially desirable result.
However, these results will be reached on a state-by-state basis; if a
jurisdiction does not accept the good faith and related arguments made
here, the consumer will be prejudiced by the FTC failure to make the
lender liable under rule 433. It is ironic that the FTC rule, which was
intended to bring order out of the chaos of state regulation of the
holder in due course, 162 doubtless will produce its own patchwork of
varying judicial interpretation as to its effect.
Rule 433, half step though it may be, already is achieving desired
results. Lenders are requiring sellers to recourse the paper they discount,16 3 thus providing the seller with a strong incentive to stand behind the goods and services he sells. Lenders also are refusing to carry
paper from fly-by-night sellers, drying up these sellers' sources of consumer credit 16 4 thus drying up this type of seller. These beneficial reeither interest rate increases
sults have been achieved without provoking
1 65
or substantial market dislocations.
However, until such time as the FTC and the Federal Reserve
Board are moved to adopt rules which directly regulate lenders (such
rules are now in the proposal stage),16 6 the courts will continue to be
faced with the problem of the seller failing to place the FTC legend in
the loan papers. Unfortunately, the problem will not go away even if the
FTC and the Federal Reserve Board act tomorrow. From May 14, 1976,
until such time as the proposed regulations are adopted, millions of consumer credit contracts will be negotiated and in those cases where the
legend is missing, the consumer may very well be prejudiced by the
FTC's failure to go all out to protect him. Hopefully, this article will
provide the courts with the U.C.C. analysis to aid them in resolving the
perplexing questions occasioned by the FTC's half measure.
162. See 2

NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER LAW HANDBOOK

503-92 (1972).

163. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., A Qualitative Evaluation of the inpact of
the Holder-In-Due-CourseRule on Lending Institutions 2 (August, 1976) (short-term

study commissioned by the FTC).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See note 24 supra.
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